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Abstract
Face anti-spoofing is crucial for the security of face recog-
nition system, by avoiding invaded with presentation attack.
Previous works have shown the effectiveness of using depth
and temporal supervision for this task. However, depth super-
vision is often considered only in a single frame, and tempo-
ral supervision is explored by utilizing certain signals which
is not robust to the change of scenes. In this work, motivated
by two stream ConvNets, we propose a novel two stream
FreqSaptialTemporalNet for face anti-spoofing which simul-
taneously takes advantage of frequent, spatial and temporal
information. Compared with existing methods which mine
spoofing cues in multi-frame RGB image, we make multi-
frame spectrum image as one input stream for the discrimina-
tive deep neural network, encouraging the primary difference
between live and fake video to be automatically unearthed.
Extensive experiments show promising improvement results
using the proposed architecture. Meanwhile, we proposed a
concise method to obtain a large amount of spoofing train-
ing data by utilizing a frequent augmentation pipeline, which
contributes detail visualization between live and fake images
as well as data insufficiency issue when training large net-
works.
Introduction
With the increasing number of applications making face im-
age as unlock cues in our daily lives, the security issue of
face spoofing has aroused great concern in the community.
Although face is an easily obtained and distinguished fea-
tures for biometric system, it can also be easily mimicked.
Presentation attack (PA), such as a simple printed photo
(print attack), a digital replay video (replay attack) or wear-
ing a mask (mask attack), could hack in a face recognition
system if no face anti-spoofing module was equipped.
To counteract presentation attack, a great number of meth-
ods (Li et al. 2004; Erdogmus and Marcel 2014; Boulke-
nafet, Komulainen, and Hadid 2016b) have been proposed.
In these methods, one or multi-frame RGB image is the
standard input for the anti-spoofing system, with which
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Figure 1: The pipeline for face anti-spoofing
handcrafted features (Ma¨a¨tta¨, Hadid, and Pietika¨inen 2011;
De Freitas Pereira et al. 2012; Tirunagari et al. 2015;
Boulkenafet, Komulainen, and Hadid 2016b) or automatic
learned deep features (Atoum et al. 2017; Tu et al. 2019) are
extracted. Binary or auxiliary information (Liu, Jourabloo,
and Liu 2018) is used to supervise the learning process.
Due to the lack of an explicit correlation between pix-
els (color or texture) and attack patterns, extracting robust
handcrafted features for different types of attack is chal-
lenging. On the other hand, deep learning methods have
been widely used to explore uncertain correlations. How-
ever, in this task, it may fall in overfitting pitfall when lit-
tle spoofing training data is presented (Yang et al. 2019).
Instead of using only RGB frames as input, there are also
efforts (Hernandez-Ortega et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2018;
Zhang et al. 2019) using near infrared spectroscopy and
depth images as extra input source for anti-spoofing judge-
ment. These methods can gain moderate improvement with
the aid of additional input data due to the reduced uncer-
tainty. Nevertheless, infrared and depth sensors are not de-
fault configuration in common mobile devices. Thus, these
methods can not show their power in real deployment envi-
ronment.
Previous researches suggest that the main issue lies in the
ubiquity of limit data source and the representational capac-
ity of spoofing feature learning. Is there a way that can uti-
lize the ability of deep network and conquer the input lack
of diversity? To solve this problem, as shown in Figure 1,
we propose a two stream deep neural network architecture.
By adding the frequent domain spectral image as extra input
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stream, the diversity of input can be increased. Depth image
is used as label to supervise the deep network to learn ro-
bustly spatial features for different presentation attack pat-
terns. Due to the intrinsic attribute of deep convolutional
network, features in deep layer express high level semantic
abstractions. This attribute goes against the goal of spoof-
ing judgement when the fact is lied in low level pixels. To
overcome the shortage, the original low level information
is reserved and passed to the classifier through the frequent
part. On the other side, large scale training data is pivotal
for a practical system. However, spoof faces is hard to ob-
tain in real environment and the new type of presentation at-
tack emerge in endlessly. How to mimic these data quickly
can affect the evolution speed of a defense system. We pro-
posed a technique to synthesize spoof faces through replac-
ing blocks in their high frequent domain by blocks from
spoof face. This technique can help us to solve the short-
age of data to a certain extent. The main contributions of
this work are summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel two stream architecture for end-to-
end mining the primary difference between live and spoof
video. This architecture improves the anti-spoof general-
ization ability by utilizing the spatial frequent temporal
domain information simultaneously.
• We propose to employ novel multi-frame spectral image
as network input, which let the original low level detail
information easily pass to the final decision layer. And the
experiment results show this setting can help to improve
the distinguish ability of the learned deep model.
• We propose a concise technique to manufacture presen-
tation attack data, which can help practical face anti-
spoofing system to obtain large scale training data in a
short time. And we demonstrate improved results and vi-
sualize the difference between live and spoof patterns.
Related Work
We review the previous face anti-spoofing works with their
learning methods and discuss their relations.
Traditional Methods. Many prior works attempt to dis-
tinguish live and spoof faces from color and texture clues. A
lot of hand-crafted features have been explored in these re-
searches, including SLRB (Tan et al. 2010), LBP (Ma¨a¨tta¨,
Hadid, and Pietika¨inen 2011; De Freitas Pereira et al.
2012), HoG (Komulainen, Hadid, and Pietika¨inen 2013),
IDA (Wen, Han, and Jain 2015), SIFT (Patel, Han, and
Jain 2016) and SURF (Boulkenafet, Komulainen, and Hadid
2016a). And traditional classifiers such as Support Vector
Machine (SVM) or Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) are
adopted in these methods. Different data domains have been
exploited to extract discriminative features, such as Fourier
frequency spectrum domain(Li et al. 2004) or HSV (Boulke-
nafet, Komulainen, and Hadid 2016b) color space.
Since one still image is weak on account of information
gain, researchers attempt to leverage temporal change in face
area. Optical flow (Bao et al. 2009), motion HOOF descrip-
tor (Bharadwaj et al. 2013) and specular difference (Ebi-
hara, Sakurai, and Imaoka 2019) are proposed as temporal-
specific features for anti-spoofing judgement. Another line
is to incorporate auxiliary information. For example, Re-
mote photoplethysmography (rPPG) (Bobbia, Benezeth, and
Dubois 2016; Liu et al. 2016; Nowara, Sabharwal, and Veer-
araghavan 2017) is used as an message for 3d mask attack
recognition. Compared to mask image sequence, the live
faces exhibit a pulse of heart rate. So the heart rate signal can
be estimated by enlarging the signal changes in the region of
interest. Color or motion details are explored to extract rPPG
signals. But rPPG signal becomes vulnerable with illumi-
nation changes of scene. Besides, these method may cost a
long period to get an accurate rPPG sinal on the test time,
which is unbearable for an app user.
Deep Learning Methods. Since AlexNet (Krizhevsky,
Sutskever, and Hinton 2012) was invented, the strong rep-
resentation power of modern CNNs are proved in image
recognition (He et al. 2016), detection (Ren et al. 2015)
and segmentation (He et al. 2017) tasks. There are many re-
cent works (Feng et al. 2016; Li et al. 2016; Tu et al. 2019;
Song et al. 2019) using CNNs for face anti-spoofing. They
regard face anti-spoofing as a binary classification problem
and learn deep feature representation for single image. How-
ever, due to the simple binary supervision, these method are
hard to generalize well in the cross-database testing. To over-
come this weakness, patch and depth-based CNNs (Atoum
et al. 2017) utilize depth image as spatial supervision for
deep features learning, which demonstrate the effectiveness
of employing depth image as auxiliary label. Instead of us-
ing single depth map as network suppervision, (Wang et
al. 2018) proposes to extract short-term and long-term mo-
tion by learning multi-frame temporal and depth informa-
tion. AuxNet (Liu, Jourabloo, and Liu 2018) advances this
method in a number of aspects, including fusion with tem-
poral supervision by rPPG signal. (Shao et al. 2019) pro-
poses to learn a generalized feature space via deep domain
generalization framework. Overall, most existing methods
tend to take one or multi-frame RGB image as CNN input
and extract feature map from deep layer as feature represen-
tation for face anti-spoofing. Since in deep neural network,
the feature maps from deep layer express high semantic level
information, these method have a hard time to conquer the
problem when fake cues lies in the low level image pixels,
which is not unusual in real environment.
In this work, motivated by two-stream ConvNet (Si-
monyan and Zisserman 2014) and two-step network (Wang
et al. 2019), we propose a novel two-stream architecture
to learn the feature in different aspect and jointly train
both sub-networks in an end-to-end manner. By employing
multi-frame frequent spectrum images as supplement of the
deep spatial part, the low level information can easily pass
through the network to classifier, consequently overcoming
the drawbacks in the aforementioned case and making this
method generalize well in real-world testing. Another im-
portant issue is data insufficiency when training deep net-
work. Previous researches tries to figure it out through dif-
ferent way. (Yang et al. 2019) presents a data collection solu-
tion along with a data synthesis technique to simulate digital
medium based face spoofing attacks. Their experiment re-
sults show data synthesis solution is effective for deep net-
work learning. But the synthesis pipeline is sophisticated
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Figure 2: The proposed frequent spatial temporal architecture
and artificial, which may not mimic the practical data well
in real environment. Face de-Spoofing (Jourabloo, Liu, and
Liu 2018) offers a perspective for detecting spoofing face
from presentation attack by inversely decomposing a spoof
face image into the live face and the spoofing noise, and a
de-spoofing CNN architecture is proposed to estimate the
spoofing noise. Reverses the idea of face de-Spoofing, we
propose to synthesize the negative presentation attack data
by adding spoofing pattern to live face. In this way, attack
image is obtained by randomly sampling from live and fake
image pair in their high frequent domain, which make the
synthesis more realistic and easy to implement.
Proposed Method
This section describes the framework and the details of our
proposed method. Firstly, we introduce the substantial char-
acteristics of the model. Then we elaborate the two stream
network architecture we proposed and the learning strategy
employed in the pipeline. Next we present the implemen-
tation details. Finally, a data synthesis technique to obtain
large scale training data is described.
Model Characteristics
The main idea of the proposed approach is to guide the deep
network to focus on the obvious spoof patterns across dif-
ferent domain, automatically make a trade off in selecting
the high level semantic deep features and low level frequent
expression. From previous work, the depth map supervision
is proved powerful for deep convolutional network to learn
spatial feature representation in face anti-spoofing task. Nev-
ertheless, there are cases which always fail in spatial do-
main. So we can not improve the model efficiency by only
reinforcing this information.
Temporal changes of input source can be utilized at this
moment. We employed it by taking multi-frame images as
network input. Due to the different level of semantic map-
ping in disparate layer of deep network, a shortcut is needed
to transfer the original input information to the classifier
when we hope the classifier to mine the spoofing cues in
low level pixels. Fourier transform is employed to get the
spectral image, which keep the whole input information but
expressed it in a different way.
Let us consider F (x) as an underlying mapping between
input source and the feature representation. And H(x) is
the measurement of information in x. Then the CNN model
would learn a mapping Fspatial between the input face and
the spatial representation layer. The hidden semantic infor-
mation, there is different spatial depth lies in live and fake
faces, is expressed by this mapping. On the other side, the
frequent mapping Ffrequent retains the original input infor-
mation. This can be expressed as the formulation:
Ffrequent(x) = y,H(x) = H(y)
Since the original input information is presented in an eas-
ily distinguished view for the classifier, that make the clas-
sifier to be simple and reduce the risk of overfitting.
Network Architecture And Training Strategy
The proposed architecture take advantage of two stream in-
put as shown in Figure 2. In the process of network learn-
ing, the top ConvNet stream evaluates each frame separately
and estimates the depth maps for them. And a sub Tempo-
ral ConvNet learns on this sequence of depth maps to gen-
erate the feature representation in spatial temporal domain.
At the same time, the bottom Temporal FreqNet collects
the spectrum images and evaluates the temporal difference
across the input of sequence automatically. A Frequent Tem-
poral feature representation in low semantic level is gener-
ated through a shallow network on these frames. Finally, the
separated spatial part and temporal frequent part are con-
catenated together to form the final feature representation.
And a fully connected layer convert the representation from
feature space to category space. A simple classifier learns on
this feature to judge whether a face is live or spoof.
We adopt the general four block 18-layer ResNet as the
backbone for the ConvNet. While this backbone can be
replaced by other convolutional network, such as VGG,
Densenet, EfficientNet, MobileNet and so on. The detail
of the whole network architecture is described in Table 1.
Given a sequence of N frame color image I256×256×3 as in-
put, we first compute their frequent information via Fourier
transform and get their spectral image I256×256f . Then fed
this sequence of consecutive N frame I to the network. Fol-
lowed the setting in (Jourabloo, Liu, and Liu 2018), we use
Table 1: The network structure of Spatial ConvNet, Fre-
qTempNet and TemporalConvNet.
Layer Filter/Stride/kernel Output Size Layer Filter/Stride Output Size
SpatialConvNet FreqTempNet
rgb+hsv 256 spectrogram 256
Conv0-0 64/2 128 InstanceNorm 256
MaxPool1 64 DepthWiseConv 5/1 256
Conv1-1 64/1 64 MaxPool2 -/8 32
Conv1-2 64/1 64 PointWiseConv 1/1 32
Conv1-3 64/1 64 LayerNorm 32
Conv1-4 64/1 64 MaxPool3 -/2 16
Conv2-1 128/1 64
Conv2-2 128/1 64
Conv2-3 128/1 64 TemporalConvNetConv2-4 128/2 64
Conv3-1 256/1 32 Conv-0 1/1 32
Conv3-2 256/1 32 MaxPool4 -/2 16
Conv3-3 256/1 32 FeatureLayerConv3-4 256/1 32
Conv4-1 512/1 32 MultiSpatialMap 16
Conv4-2 512/1 32 MultiFreqMap 16
Conv4-3 512/1 32 Concat
Conv4-4 512/1 32 FC 512
rgb+hsv as the spatial ConvNet stream input and their corre-
sponding Nf spectrum images as the input of FreqTempNet
stream.
There are two loss employed in the learning process.
Depth loss Θdepth for spatial supervision and the softmax
loss Θc for classifying error. PRNet (Feng et al. 2018) is
used to generate depth label for live faces and we normalize
them in a range of [0, 1]. While setting spoofing depth map
to 0. The estimated depth map is resized to a pre-defined size
of 32× 32, make Labeldepth ∈ R32×32.
Θdepth = ‖Fspatial(x)− Labeldepth‖
As mentioned before, this two stream architecture was de-
signed to make frequent part to be supplementary of the spa-
tial stream. Trying to conquer the failure when spoof pattern
lies in low level image pixels. To achieve this goal, we uti-
lize a training strategy from (He et al. 2019) to harmonize the
two parts. We add a learning rate warmup period for the pa-
rameters in frequent temporal part, setting the learning rate
of this part start from zero and gradually increases it to the
target value. On the other side, the learning rate for the back-
bone Spatial-ConvNet is setting to a large value and gradu-
ally decreases to zero. This configuration make the network
firstly to focus on the primary spatial semantic information
for face anti-spoofing and try it best to give its judgement. At
the later learning stage, the parameters for Spatial-ConvNet
is fixed, lead to the spatial representation unchanged. And
low level frequent stream reveal its power to overcome the
fail case in depth estimating. Then the whole framework
make a trade off in selecting between high level semantic
information and low level color texture detail automatically.
While there are several parts in the whole network architec-
ture, it can be trained in an end-to-end manner.
Data Synthesis Pipeline
Data plays an important role for a robust model learning.
Typically the training data is expected to be in a large scale
and close to the testing data.
However, current database in the community are either of
small scale or far from real world testing data. So a model
can not generalize well with these limited data. On the other
hand, presentation attack is an abnormal behavior. Com-
pared to the positive live faces can be easily downloaded
from internet, the negative fake data may cost many time to
gain. In (Yang et al. 2019), they proposed a method to mimic
the negative examples through zoom, add reflection and per-
spective transformation on live faces. And their experiment
results show that the mimic data is beneficial for the ability
of model generalization. But their mimic pipeline is sophis-
ticated. And these manually defined step may break the data
distribution in the real. Is there a brief method to implement
these process while keep the data distribution?
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Figure 3: The spoof pattern between live and fake face. Top:
live face and its frequency response. Bottom: spoof face,
we can visualize the spoof pattern hidden in high frequency
domain.
With a set of manually mimicked spoof faces in hand, we
can observe the spoof pattern behind them. Human judge
whether a face is spoofing by carefully check the detail of
the image. There will be color distortion, display artifacts
or presenting noise in fake image, which were expressed in
high frequency domain of their spectral images. We show an
example in Figure 3. There are moire pattern and color dis-
tortion in the spoof face. These effects are hard to simulate
by a pre-define step in spatial domain. But we can obtain
these spoof patterns by sampling blocks in spectral image.
If we replace these area in spectral image of live face with
the sampled ones, then the spoof pattern is transferred to live
face. This process is very concise and keep the data distribu-
tion unchanged.
Follow this way, we propose a pipeline to collect large
scale database. See the details in Figure 4. We firstly col-
lected a large scale live face database of ten thousand people
by crawling video from internet and filtered them by a face
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Figure 4: The data synthesis pipeline
detector.
Then a small percent of these face videos were selected
and a spoof dataset was manually simulated by carefully
handling on these videos. We used various kind of digital
camera (including iPhone, Huawei P10, Huawei Honer V10,
Xiaomi 4 and Redmi Note) to record the video to obtain the
replay attack videos. At the same time, printed one hundred
face image and recorded them by previous different video
camera to get print attack videos. Then the concise simulate
step is repeated on each single face image by randomly re-
placing some blocks of their spectrum image with the corre-
sponding blocks from spoofing one. Note that for a sequence
of image in one video, the areas needed to be replaced were
randomly selected in the first frame. And the same area in
the following frames is replaced by the corresponding area
of the following fake images. This setting leave the data
distribution in temporal domain unchanged. Through this
method, we can obtain large scale fake database for any type
of presentation attack with little cost. When a new spoof
type appeared in real test environment, we can produce a
large scale database for that type with different person id in
a short time. This is very helpful for the evolution of modern
face anti-spoofing system.
Experimental Results
In this section, we conduct extensive experiments on differ-
ent datasets. The experimental setup, ablation study, testing
results and analysis are illustrated in sequence.
Experimental Setup
We first describe the datasets, evaluation metrics and imple-
mentation details for all the experiments.
Datasets. The proposed model is evaluated on three
public face anti-spoofing databases, including OULU-NPU
(Boulkenafet et al. 2017), CASIA-SURF (Zhang et al. 2018)
and SiW (Liu, Jourabloo, and Liu 2018). We use SiW and
OULU-NPU for cross testing and comparing with the state
of art intra testing result on these datasets.
Evaluation metrics. The following evaluation metrics:
Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER),
Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER)
and Half Total Error Rate (HTER) are employed to compare
with prior works. The HTER is half of the sum for the False
Table 2: Different model results on OULU Protocol 2
Method APCER BPCER ACER
Depth Model 10.2 7.8 14.0
FreqSpatialNet 4.9 3.3 4.1
FreqSpatialTempNet1(5 Frames) 2.9 1.8 2.4
FreqSpatialTempNet2(10 Frames) 2.3 1.0 1.7
FreqSpatialTempNet3(20 Frames) 2.8 0.8 1.8
Rejection Rate (FRR) and the False Acceptance Rate (FAR).
Besides, ACER = (APCER+BPCER)/2 is used to report our
results. To compare the model distinguish ability under dif-
ferent threshold, we report the results of True Positive Rate
(TPR) at different False Positive Rate (FPR).
Implementation details. The proposed method is imple-
mented in MXNet (Chen et al. 2015). And the four block
ResNet-v1b-18 (He et al. 2019) is adopted as backbone net-
works for spatial part. SpatialConvNet models are trained
by learning rate 0.3 with a cosine learning rate decay and
weight decay 1e-4 by the supervision of the depth loss. The
FreqTempNet stream is trained with learning rate 0.03 and
weight decay 1e-5. All models iterate 10 epochs in the train-
ing stage while 5 epoch is setting as warmup period for the
FreqTempNet . The batch size of both spatial and frequent
stream is 16 with sequence length 10 as general setting. We
random initialize the whole network by using as normal dis-
tribution with zero mean and std of 0.02.
Ablation Study
Advantage of proposed architecture We compare three ar-
chitectures to demonstrate the advantages of the proposed
framework. And four different choices of sequence length is
compared to show the advantage of using longer input im-
age. The experiment results is shown in Table 2. The Depth
Model use only spatial stream to learning deep convolutional
features, without the low level frequent information in the
temporal frequent stream. This is implemented by setting
the spectrum image to zeros. FreqSpatialNet has a similar
architecture to the proposed method, except the input image
number is set as 1. So it can not explore the clues on tem-
poral domain. FreqSpatialTempNet1 is the proposed archi-
tecture with setting the input length of sequence as 5. While
change the input frame length to 10 and 20, we get FreqS-
Table 3: Performance in CASIA-SURF validation dataset
Method ACER TPR@FPR=10E-2 TPR@FPR=10E-3
ResNet18-Baseline 0.05 0.883 0.272
FeatherNet 0.00261 1.0 0.9615
Ours 0.016 0.958 0.763
Table 4: Results of intra-testing on OULU Protocols
Prot. Method APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%)
1
AuxNet 1.6 1.6 1.6
Temporal-Depth 2.5 0.0 1.3
Ours 2.2 0.0 1.1
2
AuxNet 2.7 2.7 2.7
Temporal-Depth 1.7 2.0 1.9
Ours 2.3 1.0 1.7
3
AuxNet 2.7± 1.3 3.1± 1.7 2.9± 1.5
Temporal-Depth 5.9± 1.9 5.9± 3.0 5.9± 1.0
Ours 4.4± 3.7 2.0± 1.4 3.2± 1.4
4
AuxNet 9.3± 5.6 10.4± 6.0 9.5± 6.0
Temporal-Depth 14.2± 8.7 4.2± 3.8 9.2± 3.4
Ours 9.3± 3.7 7.5± 3.7 8.4± 2.7
patialTempNet2 and FreqSpatialTempNet3. This help us to
compare the effectiveness of different temporal length. We
train all the model with the OULU-NPU training set under
protocol 2 and the APCER, BPCER and ACER values are
reported in testing set. As shown in Table 2, the FreqSpatial-
Net result is 4.1% (ACER) compared to the 14.0% (ACER)
of Depth Model. This demonstrate the effectiveness of the
feature combine mode. With setting the input image length
to 10 and 20, we achieve 1.7% (ACER) in FreqSpatialTemp-
Net2 and 1.8% (ACER) in FreqSpatialTempNet3. They ex-
ceed the result of FreqSpatialTempNet1. This shows the net-
work can take advantage of longer sequence input.
Intra Testing
We compare the performance of testing result on CASIA-
SUFR, OULU-NPU and SiW datasets. We follow the four
protocols on OULU-NPU and three protocols on SiW for
the testing. The metric value of APCER, BPCER, TPR at
different FRR and ACER are reported to compare the pro-
posed model and other methods on these datasets.
In Table 3, we train our model with CASIA-SURF train-
ing set and tested on its validation set, compared with
ResNet18-Baseline (Zhang et al. 2018) and FeatherNet
(Zhang et al. 2019) results. Though the results is not as
good as the FeathreNet, the experiment result is meaning-
ful. Since both the ResNet18-Baseline and FeatherNet used
RGB, IR and Depth image as network input, however our
method used only RGB images. As mentioned before, this
is more common hardware setting for mobile devices.
Table 4 shows our method achieves the lowest ACER in 3
out of 4 protocols on OULU-NPU dataset. The ACER result
is slightly worse than that of AuxNet on protocol 2. And the
intra testing experiments result on three protocols of SiW in
showed in Table 5. We achieve lowest ACER in the protocol
1 and lowest APCER in protocol 2.
Table 5: Results of intra-testing on three protocols of SiW
Prot. Method APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%)
1
AuxNet 3.58 3.58 3.58
Temporal-Depth 0.96 0.50 0.73
Ours 0.8 0.50 0.67
2
AuxNet 0.57± 0.69 0.57± 0.69 0.57± 0.69
Temporal-Depth 0.08± 0.17 0.21± 0.16 0.15± 0.14
Ours 0.00± 0.00 0.75± 0.96 0.38± 0.48
3
AuxNet 8.31± 3.81 8.31± 3.80 8.31± 3.81
Temporal-Depth 3.10± 0.79 3.09± 0.83 3.10± 0.81
Ours 9.5± 1.2 5.3± 2.1 7.4± 2.9
Table 6: Results of cross-testing on SiW and OULU
Train Test Method ACER(%)
SiW
Oulu1 AuxNet 10.0Ours 9.3
Oulu2 AuxNet 14.1Ours 7.8
Oulu3 AuxNet 13.8± 5.7Ours 16.2± 5
Oulu4 AuxNet 10.0± 8.8Ours 14.1± 8.3
SiW1
SiW1
AuxNet 3.58
Temporal-Depth 0.73
OULU Ours 7.28
OULU+SynthesizedData Ours+ 0.71
SiW2
SiW2
AuxNet 0.57± 0.69
Temporal-Depth 0.15± 0.14
OULU Ours 6.9± 1.1
OULU+SynthesizedData Ours+ 0.53± 0.26
SiW3
SiW3
AuxNet 8.31± 3.81
Temporal-Depth 3.10± 0.81
OULU Ours 11.6± 4.7
OULU+SynthesizedData Ours+ 8.02± 1.63
Cross Testing
While intra-testing can show the effectiveness of the pro-
posed method, cross testing is a touchstone for model gen-
eralization. In cross testing, the training and testing set is
selected from different database. This setting will eliminate
the bias from the limitation for data collection. In the testing
period, the person id and spoofing sensor are guaranteed dif-
fer from the training set under cross testing. And it is more
similar to the situation a face anti-spoofing system will meet
in real environment.
We reported the cross-testing results on SiW and Oulu-
NPU dataset with different training dataset setting and com-
pared the performance with the intra-testing results from
two other methods in Table 6. We see our method achieve
lower ACER in protocol 1 and 2 in OULU-NPU testing set
compared with the results from AuxNet. This result shows
the proposed method can grasp the different data distribu-
tion from live and and spoofing faces. Compared with the
intra testing result On 3 protocols of SiW from AuxNet
and Temporal-Depth, our method is just slightly worse than
them, while we using cross-testing configuration. This is
worthy of attention, since cross testing is known to be es-
sentially harder than intra testing.
We generated a synthesized dataset by randomly select-
ing 80 spoof videos from SiW training set as source data.
And handle them through the synthesize technique we in-
troduced before in section data synthesis pipeline. Then the
Figure 5: The detail between live and synthesized fake im-
age. Top: synthesized image and its local regions. Bottom:
live face crawled from internet. Moire pattern appears in the
synthesized image. Best viewed electronically.
proposed method is trained with OULU-NPU plus this syn-
thesized dataset and testing it on three protocol of SiW, the
experiment results is showed in Table 6 as OUR+. From
the result, we can see that these synthesized data help our
method achieve a performance that can compete with the re-
sults from intra-testing. This result shows that the proposed
data synthesized technique can transfer the spoofing cues to
live videos. And we can employ it to obtain large scale spoof
video for practical face anti-spoofing systems.
Visualization and Analysis
In the proposed architecture, the original spectrum images
is used to overcome the shortcoming in spatial domain. And
we proposed to replace the blocks from live face by the cor-
responding block from fake image. We are curious how will
the synthesized image look like in spatial domain? Figure 5
shows an example of the live and synthesis pair. The top is
the synthesized image with the face area generated by the
proposed technique. The bottom is the original live face and
its local regions. By comparing the details between synthe-
sized fake image and live one, we can find fake clues ap-
peared in generated face local region while the original per-
son appearance left unchanged. Since the proposed archi-
tecture will learn the detail difference between them via two
domain of input. The fake clues from the spoofing video are
passed to the classifier through both depth estimation and
frequent stream.
Conclusions
This paper proposed a practical architecture to build a ro-
bust face anti-spoofing system. The model, namely FreqSpa-
tialTempNet, utilizes both the spatial, temporal and frequent
domain information simultaneously. Mining the robust high
level deep features and low level frequent features to distin-
guish live and spoof faces. In addition, a concise data syn-
thesized technique is presented to obtain large scale training
data. It can help us break through the dilemma to some ex-
tent in which new presentation attack type emerge in end-
lessly and training data shortage is everywhere. By conduct-
ing extensive experiments on three public face anti-spoofing
datasets, the performances of the proposed method demon-
strate better generalization ability compared with other most
existing methods.
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